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Abstract 
The case of Vo v France brought forward the controversial issue if the foetus is 
entitled to “everyone’s” right to life as described in Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This issue consequently raises the question of 
when life begins, the legal status of the foetus and its connection with its mother’s 
rights. The European Court of Human Rights examined this issue many times but has 
never adopted a clear position on the matter, it rather avoids answering the question 
and is emphasizing more on allowing the Member States to decide according to their 
culture, religion, social and economic factors on this issue.      
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Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
General remarks 
Article 2 Right to Life 
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save 
in the execution of a sentence of a 
court following his conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is 
provided by law.  
2. Deprivation of life shall not be 
regarded as inflicted in contravention 
of this article when it results from the 
use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary: 
 (a) in defence of any person from 
unlawful violence;  
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or 
to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained;  
(c) in action lawfully taken for the 
purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection.” 
Article 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights refers first and 
foremost to the right to life. It is 
already clear from that position alone 
as the second article of the Convention 
that it is primarily and fundamentally 
classified amongst other rights, as it is 
characteristically stated (Douwe, 2006) 
that if a person is deprived of his right 
to life all other rights become obsolete. 
Article 2 protects every person’s right 
to life. It is clear from this wording that 
life means human life excluding 
animals and legal persons from the 
protective scope of the Article without, 
however, specifying what life and its 
time limits are: when it starts and when 
it ends. 
The Court stated in this judgment that 
it could not define a precise standard 
for the abovementioned limits, since 
there is no unanimous answer on 
behalf of science and religion on this 
thorny issue. It leaves the Member 
States scope to adjust these limits 
according to their cultural, religious, 
social and economic circumstances that 
characterize each and every one. The 
Court considers that it is preferable for 
each Member State to retain its 
autonomy in determining those limits 
without having any absolute 
commitment from the Court and will 
therefore have the power to judge each 
case independently, in a way that 
allows a flexible interpretation of the 
Convention which must be regarded as 
a living instrument adapting and 
transforming according to the different 
interpretations given to it in each case 
and not as a sterile legal document.  
The right to life 
The right to life is linked to the starting 
point of human existence; it constitutes 
the natural, logical and legal 
prerequisite for the implementation of 
every human right. It is protected as a 
direct consequence of the personality 
rights of individuals and at the same 
time as a fundamental prerequisite for 
its application without equating or 
guaranteeing the right to a certain 
standard of living or the right to the 
free development of personality, even 
from the provision itself it appears that 
this is easier to define negatively. 
In particular, the scope of the Article 
does not, primarily, concern the right 
to give a person life or to put an end to 
his or her life, but it recognizes the 
right not to be deprived of his or her 
life in the cases that Article 2 
mentions. The State in this context is 
obliged not only to refrain from any 
behavior which may be a cause of 
death "intentionally" but also to take 
the necessary measures (preventive or 
repressive) to protect life, especially in 
the field of medical errors the Court 
held that the State's obligation to 
protect life under the provision of A 2 
includes the obligation of hospitals to 
have regulations in order to protect 
patients' lives as well as to establish an 
effective judicial system for 
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determining the cause of death in the 
hospital and attributing responsibility 
to medical staff. 
It is apparent, therefore, that the right 
to life is restricted to its significant 
declaration without the precise 
definition of neither its core nor its 
limits due to the fact that the 
Convention must retain its general and 
flexible nature, while allowing the 
Member States to define it on the basis 
of their own particular circumstances. 
The same general and flexible wording 
we notice at domestic constitutions 
with the current ones not specifying 
again the context of the right while the 
old ones do not even include a specific 
provision for this right (Katrougkalos, 
1993). From this general wording can 
be concluded that the life of every 
human being is protected regardless of 
his or her age, state of health and 
abilities. 
The protection of life, despite its 
obvious and undeniable importance, is 
not absolute; it retreats in view of the 
exceptional protection of other goods 
(i.e. during periods of war). In the 
provision of A 2 paragraph 2 are 
mentioned three exceptions where the 
death resulting from violence is not 
illegal, but it does not seem that these 
exceptions are limited to deliberate 
homicide. It describes situations in 
which violence is generally permitted 
as strictly necessary and can lead to 
deprivation of life.  
Considering the abovementioned, 
when the prima facie absolute 
character of a fundamental right is 
becoming relevant, how can we 
assume that it will also include issues 
raised as controversial?  
Who is included in Article 2   
All persons shall be entitled to the right 
to life: minors, foreigners, mentally 
and physically ill patients, those 
incapable of legal capacity (a general 
legal capacity is required as a liberal 
constitutional order cannot exclude 
anyone from this fundamental right).  
The main interpretative problem that 
arises in determining who is entitled to 
the right to life according to A 2 of the 
Convention is when the above national 
constitution and laws protection of A 2 
begins and ends. When does human 
life begin and with it and the protection 
of its right? This question cannot be 
answered only in medical terms, as it is 
primarily a matter of social and ethical 
evaluation, it is determined on the 
basis of the prevailing perceptions in 
society as they are shaped by the 
political, religious, economic 
conditions for the assessment of the 
relevant principles and their 
prioritization.  
As before, there is no unanimous 
answer today concerning the point 
from which the foetus is considered a 
person (Katrougkalos, 1993). In 
science it seems undeniable that the 
foetus is a distinct living organism 
from the moment of its implantation 
into the uterus, in particular the cells 
that make up the implanted embryo 
already contain the genetic codes that 
govern it and its subsequent natural 
development. However, this does not 
mean that the foetus enjoys the rights 
of the person to whom the State may 
have a derived responsibility for 
protection, nor that the embryo already 
incorporates an inherent value for 
which its protection is necessary. Its 
protection, as has already been 
mentioned, is not determined by 
objective biological data but more by 
ethical and social (Dworkin, 2013).  
At this point, in order to highlight the 
hazards of the vague nature of the link  
between the protection of life and 
ethical and social criteria, it is 
necessary to refer to Singer's extreme 
views that only the "individuals" who 
are aware have the right to life, he even 
believed that the common homicide 
and the homicide of a neonate do not 
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have the same moral disapproval since 
the neonate has no awareness of its 
existence. Singer becomes even more 
provocative claiming that the fetus has 
no greater value than non-human life 
since it lacks certain properties 
required to be classified as a person 
(by week 18 its CNS has not been 
developed, so if the pregnant woman 
has an abortion by that time the 
existence of a thing that has no value 
per se ends). The position of mr. 
Hoerster, who advocates the freedom 
of abortion, is similar, since he 
considers that the embryo has no 
desires and plans for the future, not 
even self-awareness.  
 
The embryo’s right to life 
The ECHR has not answered the 
question of whether or not the foetus is 
covered by the term “everyone” that A 
2 uses. On the contrary, in the case of 
Vo v France all separate and dissenting 
opinions expressed, answered the 
question of applicability and there are 
strong arguments that the foetus, at 
least a viable one, is in fact covered by 
the term “everyone” within the 
meaning of Article 2. First, the Court 
may avoid answering this controversial 
subject but it has never completely 
excluded the foetus from the 
possibility of being included in A 2. 
Instead, the ECHR has repeatedly 
applied the “even assuming” formula 
which would not have been necessary 
if Article 2 had been considered to be 
entirely inapplicable. Moreover, they 
claim that there is no crucial difference 
between a foetus and a neonate, 
because both are similarly dependent 
upon their mother. The fact alone that 
the foetus does not have an 
independent existence from its mother 
does not lead to a different result and, 
as this case illustrates very well, 
separate protection is needed at least 
for the viable fetus and its mother. 
Finally, today the advancement of 
technology brings forth serious legal 
and ethical issues concerning human 
life and the legal concept of its 
protection. Therefore, the increasing 
role of bioethics especially when it 
comes to medically assisted 
reproduction and subjects such as 
prenatal diagnosis, reproductive 
cloning makes it impossible for the 
Court not to set a primary course by 
defining basic questions. 
Consequently, the interpretation of 
Article 2 must evolve with these new 
developments, requiring now the 
inclusion of the right to life of the fetus 
(Pichon, 2006). 
It is clear from what has already been 
mentioned that the Convention 
establishes the right to life as a general 
obligation to be fulfilled by the 
Member States which have ratified it. 
From this point on it is for them to 
define the specific framework by 
means of their national legislative 
procedures by specifying this right 
either in their constitution or in their 
laws.  
The first issue that arises in the 
implementation of A 2 concerns the 
point in time from which life begins. 
Initially, the term “everyone” does not 
exclude the possibility that unborn life 
falls within the scope of the Article. 
There is no national and international 
agreement on this issue. In the context 
of the Greek legal system, the foetus is 
considered subject to law only after it 
is born alive, and it is not the subject of 
a right until then.  
The legal order recognizes the 
existence of the foetus as a legal asset 
which requires legal protection and not 
as a right-holder, since if it was not the 
case the protection of the foetus would 
have to be made equal to the protection 
of the mother. In order to recognize the 
foetus as the holder of a constitutional 
right, it would not be decisive for it to 
involve in a person, the simple origin 
by human beings, as this view can 
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easily lead to misunderstandings and 
racist beliefs. The person is a right 
holder because of his participation and 
his determination from social relations, 
the foetus cannot be included in them 
and therefore is not protected as a right 
holder. However, through these social 
relations the life of the unborn child is 
protected as an object of right, since it 
is considered to be a property of the 
mother's body and incorporates her 
right to a family, self-determination, 
free development of personality.  
We note that we do not refer to the 
foetus’s life but to its existence as if is 
implied the prospect of existence 
evolving into life, as more complete. 
The person is the official, final, 
physical and effective cause and 
principle for the development and 
operation of the stages of human 
material and human mental status; they 
belong to the person because he causes 
them himself. Finally, the person is the 
social and logical individual who 
naturally claims personality for himself 
and who passes it to other people. In 
other words, personality implies not 
only the existence of a passive ability 
to gain consciousness and reason, but 
rather an active ability to cause itself 
the very existence and development of 
its individual capabilities, physical and 
mental (Barry, 1989, 11). Therefore, 
since the existence of the foetus is 
neither independent nor fulfills the 
above conditions, it is not susceptible 
to the actual protection of A 2 but is 
indirectly protected through its mother. 
It is a potential life which cannot be 
considered as equal to the lives of 
persons already born and engaged in 
society so the protection afforded to it 
is (indirectly) constitutional but not 
absolute. We talk of a potential life 
because the personality of the foetus, 
as an unborn person, is not 
immediately apparent, since life at 
such an early stage is not manifested 
by functions manifested in persons 
already born. The functions performed 
by the embryo are natural and 
characteristic for persons moving 
towards full maturity. 
Karabelas (Karabelas, 1987), on the 
contrary, states that the State must 
protect human life born and unborn, 
every human being regardless of age, 
mental status, etc., and the fetus by 
claiming that it has only the right to its 
life. The crucial thing here is "its" 
because this does not establish the 
right to life as such, but as a right to 
self-determination, since he continues 
to say that it does not belong to the 
property of another person or his 
mother. If this would be the case, it 
does not seem consistent with the 
modern view of the issue, since 
according to this view, pregnant 
women would no longer have the right 
to self-determination themselves, they 
be forced solely by the fact that they 
are pregnant to carry it out and would 
not be able to take decisions on their 
own bodies, whereas if they did act in 
a way that would ultimately be harmful 
to the foetus would they risk being 
punished? The fetus is certainly a 
particularly sensitive entity because of 
its lack of defense capability in the 
event of an attack on its existence, but 
that does not mean that its protection 
should go to the other end, that of its 
equation with the rights of the mother.  
Only the American Convention on 
Human Rights explicitly refers to the 
foetus in relation to the right to life, as 
a basic right from which various rights 
originate, in Article 4 paragraph 1: 
"Every person has the right to respect 
his or her life. The right must be 
protected by law and generally, from 
the moment of conception. No one 
should arbitrarily be deprived of their 
lives". While it is indirectly protected 
in Article 6 paragraph 5 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: "The death penalty 
cannot be imposed on a pregnant 
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woman." highlighting at this point that 
the foetus is clearly protected in this 
case through its mother's rights.  
The Court refrains from answering the 
above question showing two levels of 
approach: firstly, it refuses to answer 
whether the foetus is entitled to full 
protection under A 2 for the protection 
of the right to life and secondly it 
responded to the equally crucial issue 
of when human life begins: it states 
that the foetus’s life is closely linked to 
its mother’s and can be protected 
through it, meaning that the Court 
leaves no doubt that the fetus has a life 
in the context of evolving existence but 
does not respond in either direction as 
to whether it requires the full 
protection granted to "every person" 
under A 2 (Wicks, 2012 and Pichon, 
2006). 
 
The criterion of viability  
An issue which is constantly coming 
up in the study of whether the foetus 
has the protection of the right to life is 
that of its viability. There is no doubt 
that the fertilized egg of the 'next day' 
is also a right-holder as is the formed 
embryo of the later months of 
pregnancy. However, the fact that it is 
permitted to be destroyed by the next 
day's pill demonstrates precisely that 
limit, that before the embryo becomes 
viable in itself, it cannot be regarded as 
a subject of rights (Katrougkalos, 
1993). 
A comparison of the laws of the 
European States on abortion shows that 
there is broad agreement on the point 
between 22 and 28 weeks from which 
the interests of the foetus in terms of 
its existence become important but not 
necessarily sufficient to compare them 
with those of the pregnant woman 
(Plomer, 2005). This period also 
coincides with the scientific definition 
of the viability of the embryo. Today, 
with the advances in technology, 
neonates born in the 22nd week can be 
supported and survive, the World 
Health Organization places the onset of 
the perinatal period at week 22 and 
neonates born within the above period 
are considered to have reached the 
viability threshold (in the past newborn 
infants born before week 28 used to be 
previable).   
The interests of the embryo in life by 
recognizing the criterion of viability 
must under no circumstances be 
considered to prevail or even to bind 
the rights of the mother to the absolute 
protection of her life and health. It is 
accepted that the legal division of the 
foetus’s right to life is gradually 
reduced to the last stages of embryo 
life in relation to embryo development 
at the start of pregnancy. Even the 
most liberal in their views such as 
Dworkin (Dworkin, 2013) who denies 
the legal and moral obligation to 
protect the life of the fetus in early 
pregnancy, agree nevertheless on the 
fact that as long as the foetus acquires 
the ability for autonomous existence it 
is gradually entitled to proportionate 
legal and moral protection. In fact, by 
analyzing the conclusions of 
specialized doctors on the point in time 
from which the fetus feels pain (30 
weeks when the development of the 
cortex of the brain has the appropriate 
nerve substrate for the sensation of 
pain), Dworkin concludes that it is 
undeniable that the fetus does not have 
the necessary nerve substrate for 
interests of any kind up to a relatively 
late stage of pregnancy.  
But why is the criterion of the viability 
of the embryo important? Firstly, 
because at the time of the embryo's 
viability, as defined above and not 
earlier, its brain has developed 
sufficiently that a basic ability to feel it 
is now available so it can be argued 
that the fetus has its own interests to 
exist, but this does not mean that from 
this point on it is recognized as a 
person with a corresponding obligation 
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to protect it by the State. Secondly, 
because before the point of the 
embryo's viability, pregnant women 
have a broad margin to decide whether 
to continue or discontinue their 
pregnancy, this has to do with the 
awareness and judgment of the 
pregnant woman as to her condition (a 
very small percentage of 0.01% of 
abortion takes place in the third 
quarter), when the fetus's physical 
development has progressed to such an 
extent that any extension of the 
abortion period appears to be it 
resolves the innate value of human life.  
 
Conclusion 
Issues relating to the time limits of life 
are particularly sensitive as they 
include factors other than scientific- 
medical and legal ones. They concern 
the whole of society and they relate to 
issues which man, because of their 
intensity and nature, deals with 
primarily with emotion and not with 
reason and rules. Religion and society 
are the main referral points, as no 
legislation has been adopted, even 
when it was scientifically justified, if 
society was not prepared to accept and 
implement it. The Court correctly 
recognizes the Member States' 
discretion to regulate these matters 
according to their specific 
circumstances without making a 
decision which ignores the specific 
features of each State, but it must, in 
view of the same nature and increasing 
importance of these issues relating to 
the extremes of life, take a stand and 
give a direction to the Member States 
so that there is a solid basis on which 
they can regulate their legislation.  
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